elfenpfad hat geschrieben:Britta hat geschrieben:Nur haben sie wirklich nur die Dümmsten erwischt. Die Drahtzieher sind im Iran nicht zu finden. Die haben die nur ausgebildet und das Material für die Bomben geliefert.
Da stellt man unwillkürlich sich immer wieder diese Frage: Wer ist schuldiger - die Drahtzieher, oder die willigen
Vollstrecker: welche Hände sind "schmutziger" ???
Ich würde sagen, die Intelligenz dahinter hat die schmutzigeren Hände. Dumme Leute lassen sich leicht manipulieren.
Für die Welt sind die iranischen (noch nicht vorhandenen) Atomwaffen eine Bedrohung und es werden sich viele finden, die die Ermordung der iranischen Wissenschaftler in Ordnung finden. Es ist schon armseelig, wenn Regierungen keine diplomatische Lösung finden können/wollen, und solche Verbrechen begehen.
Der Iran kann - laut den Wikileaks-Cables, in den nächsten Jahren keinesfalls eine Atombombe bauen. Das Argument, warum sie lieber selbst daran arbeiten, Uran anzureichern, statt angereichertes Uran von anderen Ländern zu kaufen ist, dass sie dann jederzeit erpressbar wären und man ihnen die Lieferung verweigern würde. Da wurden in den Cables extra Gegenargumente für die Verhandlungen an die Botschaft in Brasilia geschickt.
Ist auch eine schöne, informative Zusammenfassung, was sich da so in den Jahren hinter den Kulissen getan hat. Hab's mal ein bischen umformatiert, damit es leichter zu lesen ist. Englisch ist es halt trotzdem noch.
http://wikileaks.ulalala.net/cable/2009 ... 18094.html1. (U) This is an action request for Embassy Brasilia. Please see paragraphs 5-6.
¶2. (C) Summary. The Department requests Embassy Brasilia persuade Brazilian officials to use the expected November 23 visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Brazil to urge Iran's constructive engagement with the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (P5+1) on its nuclear program, its full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and its assistance in freeing unjustly imprisoned American citizens. End Summary.
Mit 'Post' ist der Botschafter gemeint...
7. (U) Post may draw on following guidance in responding to any counter-arguments or questions from the Brazilian government.
-- In the TRR proposal, why must Iran surrender all of its LEU in one batch, and why must it be before the end of the year?
o The TRR proposal was developed both to supply Iran with the fuel required for the continued operation of the reactor and also as a measure to build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions and its seriousness to negotiate.
o By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply agreement Iran signed for the reactor with Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen international concerns that Iran was attempting to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to an eventual breakout from the NPT. This would consequently allow more time for negotiations on the broader nuclear file.
o The transfer by the end of the year is needed to ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for the reactor before December 2010, when the reactor will run out and be forced to shut down.
-- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the international community? Isn't it under full IAEA monitoring?
o Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards.
o However, given Iran's long history of IAEA safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the international community cannot trust that Iran will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT altogether.
o This project will remove an immediate source of concern and establish some confidence in Iran's peaceful intent and willingness to comply with its obligations. -
- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel assemblies for the TRR in the current international environment, in which many openly seek to diminish Iran's nuclear capacity?
o We and our partners have each made political commitments at the highest levels to the fulfillment of this project. Should Iran agree to it, Iran will receive the fuel required.
o All participants in this project are taking risks. Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII UNSC resolutions. This project offers Iran an opportunity to establish confidence in its peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded due to Iran's continued non-compliance.
-- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to international demands, and received no benefit. Why should Iran trust the international community now?
o Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other activities in the past was intended to support a diplomatic process. Unfortunately, Iran terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005 by abandoning suspension.
o However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary suspension avoided its being reported to the UN Security Council and the sanctions that would have likely come along with that report.
o The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that diplomatic process and to lead to a final resolution of international concerns with Iran's nuclear program.
o This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC stated its intention to suspend implementation of the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear and related activities.
o Trust is in short supply on both sides. It is for that reason that we have offered Iran several opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR proposal).
-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear status? Does it not also destabilize the region?
o The United States has long pressed for universal adherence to the NPT treaty and will continue to urge all states that have not done so to join the Treaty and accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities.
o It is extremely difficult, however, to persuade a state that NPT adherence is in its security interest when its neighbors are in violation of their own NPT obligations, and when the international community has not demonstrated the political will necessary to enforce compliance.
o Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations bears out these concerns and undermines attempts to secure universal adherence to the NPT. It became a party to the treaty and proceeded to violate its obligations for over twenty years, presenting a fundamental threat to the entire nonproliferation regime.
o Returning regional states to full compliance with their NPT obligations would remove a serious obstacle to NPT adherence by all states in the region.
o An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves as a destabilizer in the region, possibly triggering proliferation across the Gulf in response to a mounting threat posed by Iran. Not only does this undermine the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime, but risks further instability in the region.
-- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret, when it was Iran that announced its existence and invited IAEA inspectors to visit?
o Iran was required to declare the existence of this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision was made to construct it, not several years into its construction. This is a requirement of Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement).
o This code was modified after revelations surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in the early 1990s.
o Iran was the last state to agree to the revised code, but it did so in March 2003. Iran attempted to revert to the early form of the code (which requires notification only 180 days prior to the introduction of nuclear to the facility) in March 2007. The IAEA consistently has denied that Iran has the legal ability to make such a change.
o We also believe that Iran made the decision to declare the facility not to conform to its legal obligations, but because it had become aware that the secrecy of the facility had been compromised.
-- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the self-appointed E3+3? Isn't the IAEA the proper place for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the international community?
o We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA. But despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with the IAEA. Iran has refused for several years to answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad violations of its international obligations).
o The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. -- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as the Qom Enrichment Facility because for years both the United States and Israel have threatened to bomb its nuclear sites. Is it not surprising Iran would try to keep its location a secret to have an emergency back-up facility?
o Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive nuclear installations is the cause for the international community's concerns that surrounding its nuclear program.
o Iran's decision to construct yet another clandestine site only deepens these concerns.
-- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran?
o Legally, Iran can purchase fuel from an international supplier if it wishes.
o However, we are confident Iran would not find a willing supplier given the concerns surrounding its nuclear program and its continued defiance of the international community.
o Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal before Iran, we would oppose such a deal.
-- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had "no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR?
o Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all uranium enrichment- related activities. We have offered Iran a way to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further violating these obligations. Enrichment activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR would be a violation of current UNSCRs.
o Further, Iran is not currently able to produce the fuel. Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges to produce the required enrichment level (19.75 percent) would cause serious international concern and could permit Iran to produce a stockpile of even greater enriched uranium than it has currently (Iran's current enrichment level is 3.5 percent). This would increase the risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.
-- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian enrichment program has not grown. What is the significance of this stagnation?
o Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment program several times since the project became public in 2002.
o There are many possible explanations for the stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program, including technical issues with the centrifuges and general system maintenance.
o Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its enrichment program, it continues to enrich and stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of three United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for full suspension of its nuclear and enrichment related activities, and increases the risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT and sprint to producing nuclear weapons.
Ob der Botschafter alle Punkte so im Gespräch gebracht hat?
Für mich ist bei dem Punkt:
-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear status? Does it not also destabilize the region? sehr schön zu erkennen, wie vom Thema abgelenkt werden soll...
People who lie to others have merely hidden away the truth, but people who lie to themselves have forgotten where they put it.