Ich hab selbst schon öfter in den letzten Tagen versucht, diese Dokumente einzusehen. Heute hat es mal geklappt. Ich hab dann wahllos etwas aus den letzten Jahren angeklickt und mich überraschen lassen, was ich da finde. Hier mal, was ich gelesen habe:
http://213.251.145.96.nyud.net/cable/20 ... N1350.html
S E C R E T LONDON 001350
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR U/S ROOD, PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PINR, PREL, LE, UK
SUBJECT: HMG RAISES THE BAR ON INTEL FLIGHTS
REF: A. STATE-LONDON SVTC MAY 9
¶B. LONDON 1159 C. MAY 1 GILLARD-TREMONT LETTER D. LONDON 1115 E. LONDON 1064 F. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4, b/d.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary and Recommendation. FCO contacts explained May 14 that HMG’s May 1 approval (ref C) for CEDAR SWEEP flights had been widely considered at MOD and FCO, with some departments flagging concerns about the information provided by the USG. HMG is concerned that the request for reconnaissance flights may have been made by the Lebanese MOD, rather than the entire GOL. Embassy will be receiving a new letter from HMG setting out that HMG approval for CEDAR SWEEP was based on the understanding that the flights are approved by the entire GOL. Secondly, FCO is concerned that human rights reports, including the State Department’s own, do not reflect the sterling reputation of the LAF as conveyed in our April 14 request for use of Akrotiri airbase. HMG expects the United States to monitor use of the CEDAR SWEEP intel and ensure the LAF lives up to its commitment to maintain high human rights standards. Embassy London is concerned by HMG’s piling on of concerns and conditions, which portend a burdensome process for getting the rest of our intel flights approved, per ref B. We recommend high level approaches to MOD and FCO counterparts to register concern about these new conditions. Embassy Beirut may also want to consider having the GOL engage the British directly. End Summary.
Concerns And/Or Implied Conditions
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¶2. (S/NF) John Hillman of FCO’s Whitehall Liaison Department informed PolMilOff May 14 of several HMG concerns/conditions about CEDAR SWEEP that could jeopardize future use of British territory. First, Hillman said that the FCO regional bureau responsible for Lebanon had questioned USG assurances that the reconnaissance missions were requested by “the Government of Lebanon.” The regional bureau was concerned that the request for reconnaissance assistance may have only been made by the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, rather the entire Lebanese cabinet, which apparently requires consensus on controversial issues. HMG believed the GOL could disavow assertions that it requested reconnaissance assistance if the flights were made public. Hillman said that HMG was “entitled to accept” the USG understanding that MOD was authorized to make the request on behalf of the entire GOL. HMG has sent Embassy London a follow-up letter (not yet received) emphasizing that HMG’s May 1 approval was contingent on the understanding that the request was made by the GOL. Hillman said that, should the GOL disavow the request and it become clear that the entire GOL was not supportive of the flights, HMG would have difficulty approving the involvement of British territory in CEDAR SWEEP.
¶3. (S/NF) Second, Hillman said the FCO human rights department noted that, despite the Lebanese MOD’s assurances that it would not use the shared intel unlawfully, Human Rights Watch and even the State Department’s own Human Rights Report had documented cases of torture and arbitrary arrest by the LAF. Hillman underscored that if there were any risk that detainees captured with the help of CEDAR SWEEP intel could be tortured, HMG would expect the USG to impress upon the LAF that assurances of lawful treatment must be upheld in practice. Furthermore, Hillman said, to the extent that the USG becomes aware of arrests made as a result of CEDAR SWEEP intel, HMG expects the USG to ensure the detainees are treated lawfully. If the U.S. became aware of “reasons to doubt LAF assurances,” HMG would expect to be notified immediately. Hillman noted that these human rights considerations would undoubtedly be reviewed in the next Cedar Sweep approval cycle.
Comment and Recommendation
--------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Hillman emphasized that the decision to approve CEDAR SWEEP had been widely discussed in MOD and FCO, with the decision made by Minister Kim Howells, but even Foreign Secretary had been informed. He noted that “the highly cautious approach is a reflection of Parliamentary, public, and media attention to issues involving UK complicity in human rights violations.”
¶5. (S/NF) Embassy London finds these additional conditions for HMG approval and assumptions about our ability to monitor every CEDAR SWEEP-related apprehension to be not only burdensome but unrealistic. We recommend that DOD and State officials raise with UK counterparts the concern that excessive conditions such as described above will hinder, if not obstruct, our cooperative counterterrorism efforts. While we share HMG’s concerns that human rights not be sacrificed for the sake of CT, we cannot take a risk-avoidance approach to CT in which the fear of potentially violating human rights allows terrorism to proliferate in Lebanon. We also recommend that Embassy Beirut consider whether it would help to have the urge the GOL engage the British directly. HMG is supportive of the Siniora government and may be less rigid if asked to assist by the Siniora government itself. Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
Da hat mich dann interessiert, was denn CEDAR SWEEP ist und ich hab danach gegoogelt:
http://uprootedpalestinians.blogspot.co ... uests.html
Es geht also darum, dass die Briten den Amerikanern erlaubt haben, über eine Basis Akrotiri der Royal Air Force in Zypern, Spionageflüge über dem Libanon durchzuführen. Es gab wohl eine Erlaubnis eines libanesischen Regierungsmitgliedes für diese Verletzung des libanesischen Territoriums, jedoch ohne Mitwissen des Restes der Regierung.
Es gab auch Entführungen und die Nutzung der per Spionageflug gesammelten Informationen, die in der Folge zur Verhaftung und Folter von Menschen durch die libanesische Armee führten.
Besonders heikel ist wohl, dass der libanesische Verteidigungsminister den Israelis Anweisung gegeben habe, wie sie am Besten den Libanon besetzen können.
Ich schaue auf jeden Fall immer mal wieder in die Dateien, wenn sie denn erreichbar sind. Nicht alles ist interessant, aber das hier hab ich noch, aus Frankreich:
Litvinenko Case
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¶6. (S) Fried commented that the short-term trend inside Russia was negative, noting increasing indications that the UK investigation into the murder of Litvinenko could well point to some sort of Russian involvement. MGM called attention to Chirac’s statement encouraging the Russians to cooperate in the investigation. He wondered aloud who might have given the order, but speculated the murder probably involved a settling of accounts between services rather than occurring under direct order from the Kremlin. Fried, noting Putin’s attention to detail, questioned whether rogue security elements could operate, in the UK no less, without Putin’s knowledge. Describing the current atmosphere as strange, he described the Russians as increasingly self-confident, to the point of arrogance.
Also wurde spekuliert, die Russen hätten etwas mit Litvinenkos Ermordung zu tun und man konfrontierte Putin mit diesem Verdacht. Hat wohl etwas für schlechte Stimmung gesorgt, bei dem Treffen...
Und zu Georgien:
7. (C) Fried, noting he had discussed Georgia the previous evening with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud (septel), said it was important to support Georgian sovereignty against Russian pressure for three reasons: the situation overall in Georgia was improving under Saakashvili’s leadership; violation of Georgian territorial integrity would set a dangerous precedent; and Germany and Central and Eastern Europe had a strong interest in ensuring that gas and oil pumped from Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not travel exclusively through pipelines owned or controlled by Russia. MGM responded that France supported Georgia’s independence but wondered how to accomplish this within existing structures. The heart of NATO was Article 5, and it was doubtful that NATO would declare war on Russia over Georgia; it was therefore important to bypass Article 5 and find a “specific way” that did not involve NATO membership. If Georgia joins, Armenia may follow. Even in the case of Turkey, was its Kurdish problem one for Europeans, MGM asked.
¶8. (C) Fried assured MGM that the U.S. was not seeking membership for Georgia soon, but it was important not to close the door in order to continue to promote Georgian reform and development. It was incumbent on the West to support Georgian sovereignty and maintain a united front against Russia, he argued. He related that he had urged Saakashvili not to seek crises with Russia, since crisis worked only for Russia, and time was on Georgia’s side so long as it moved quietly. In five years, a burgeoning Georgian economy had the potential to dramatically change the politics of the region. MGM agreed in principle, but suggested one could differ on ways and means.
Und noch was über russische Waffenlieferungen, aus der moskauer Botschaft:
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS PREL, ECON, MARR, MASS, PARM, PINR, PINS, RS
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
REF: A. STATE 137954 B. MOSCOW 3207 C. MOSCOW 3139 D. MOSCOW 3023 E. MOSCOW 557 F. MOSCOW 402
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: FM Lavrov’s disinterest in establishing an expert level dialogue on arms sales begs the question of how best to address our concerns over Russia’s arms export policy. Russian officials are deeply cynical about our motives in seeking to curtail Russian arms exports to countries of concern and the threatened imposition of U.S. sanctions has not proven successful so far in modifying Russian behavior. Russia attaches importance to the volume of the arms export trade, to the diplomatic doors that weapon sales open, to the ill-gotten gains that these sales reap for corrupt senior officials, and to the lever it provides the Russian government in stymieing American interests. While Russia will reject out of hand arguments based on the extraterritorial application of American sanctions, Russian officials may be more receptive to a message couched in the context of Russian international obligations and domestic legislation, the reality of American casualties, and the backlash to Russian strategic interests among moderate Sunni governments. In making our argument, we should remember that Russian officialdom and the public have little, if any, moral compunction about the arms trade, seeing it instead as a welcome symbol of Russia’s resurgent power and strength in the world. End Summary
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Russian Arms Sales Matter
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¶2. (C) Russian arms sales are consequential, totaling approximately USD 6.7 billion in 2006, according to official figures. This amount reflects a 12 percent increase over 2005, and a 56 percent increase since 2003. Russian arms sales are expected to total at least USD 8 billion in 2007. Russia has made a conscious effort to improve after-sales customer service and warranties, which has added to the attractiveness of its weapons. As a result, Russian weapons command higher prices than previously. Russia is ranked second only to the United States in arms sales to the developing world, and a sizeable portion of its arms trade is with countries of concern to us.
¶3. (C) While no sales were reported in 2006 to Iran, Syria, or Sudan, in 2007 Iran reportedly paid Russia USD 700 million for TOR-M1 air defense missile systems. While Syrian economic conditions are a natural brake on trade with the Russians, as a matter of principle the GOR is prepared to sell “defensive” equipment such as anti-tank missiles and Strelets (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles, as well as upgrade MiG-23 fighters. The GOR barred the sale of Iskander-E tactical missiles to Syria only after intense international pressure. Venezuela remains a growth market, with arms transfers in 2006 totaling more than USD 1.2 billion, including 24 Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers and 34 helicopters. Russia has an “open arms” approach to Venezuela, and whether it’s the transfer of more than 72,000 AK-103 assault rifles or negotiations for the prospective sale of three Amur class submarines (valued at USD 1 billion), Russia is prepared to entertain Chavez’s grandiose regional visions.
¶4. (C) Defense experts emphasize that the American and European domination of traditional NATO markets and capture of new entrants (and old Soviet customers) from Central and Eastern Europe means that Russia must court buyers that fall outside the U.S. orbit. By definition, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela are good markets for Russia because we don’t compete there.
¶5. (C) While concrete numbers are hard to come by, our best figures indicate that Russian arms sales to its traditional big-ticket customers -- China and India -- are growing. Russian experts, however, predict a declining trajectory in the medium term. In 2006, Russia completed approximately USD 1.4 billion in sales to China, including eight diesel submarines and 88 MI-171’s, which means the PRC only narrowly edged out Chavez as Russia’s most important customer. Russian defense experts underscore that as China’s technological sufficiency and political influence grow, the PRC will develop increasing military self-sufficiency and greater ability to challenge Russia as a supplier. At the same time, sales to India totaled only USD 360 million. Russia and India, in fact, have signed arms deals worth USD
MOSCOW 00005154 002 OF 004
2.6 billion, but not all deliveries and payments have been made. While Russian experts still downplay the ability of the U.S. to displace Russia in the Indian arms market, for reasons of cost and the legacy of decades’ old dependence, they recognize increasing American inroads and growing influence. Other notable Russian markets include Algeria, Czech Republic, Vietnam, South Korea and Belarus.
